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ESSAY 
 
THE PRUDENTIAL THIRD-PARTY STANDING  
OF FAMILY-OWNED CORPORATIONS 
MATTHEW I. HALL† & BENJAMIN MEANS†† 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 26, 2013, the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether 
for-profit corporations or their shareholders have standing to challenge 
federal regulations that implement the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA).1 At issue in the two cases consolidated for appeal, Hobby 
Lobby 2  and Conestoga Wood Specialties, 3  are regulations mandating that 
employers with fifty or more employees offer health insurance that includes 
coverage for all contraceptives approved by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA).4 The plaintiffs assert that providing certain types of contraceptive 
 
†  Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. 
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thank Alex McDonald for excellent research assistance and Josie Brown, Nathan Chapman, Colin 
Miller, Elizabeth Pollman, Eric Rasmusen, Bo Rutledge, Thomas Rutledge, and Howard 
Wasserman for helpful comments. 
1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, ��� Stat. ��� (����) (codified as amended in scattered sections of �� and 
42 U.S.C.). 
2 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 
(2013). 
3 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 
F.3d 377 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (requiring coverage of women’s 
preventive care provided for in the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) 
guidelines); Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN., 
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (mandating coverage of “[a]ll 
Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and 
patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity”). Over ninety 
challenges to the mandate have been filed, approximately half by for-profit corporations and half 
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care would be contrary to their religious beliefs and allege, therefore, that 
the mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(RFRA)5 as well as the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.6 
The government does not dispute that the family owners of Hobby 
Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties are sincere in their religious 
objections.7 However, the mandate applies only to employers and imposes 
no direct duties upon corporate shareholders.8 Thus, a threshold issue in 
these cases and dozens of other pending cases involving for-profit corpora-
tions is whether any plaintiff has standing to challenge the mandate.9 Some 
courts have concluded that religious objections to the mandate are simply 
nonjusticiable.10 Other courts have found standing, either by endorsing the 
novel proposition that a for-profit business corporation is, itself, a person 
capable of religious exercise,11 or by allowing individual owners who have no 
personal obligations or liability under the ACA’s mandate to nevertheless 
interpose a religious objection.12 
As even a quick summary of the existing circuit split reveals, resolution 
of the issues of first impression presented by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga 
Wood Specialties would require the Court to engage difficult questions at the 
intersection of religious faith and the corporate form.13 The Court’s task is 
 
by nonprofits. HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND, http://www.becketfund.org/ 
hhsinformationcentral (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
5 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507 (1997) (providing that the federal government may not substantially burden religious 
exercise without a compelling justification, even if the burden results from the application of a 
facially neutral law). 
6 Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1120-21. 
7 See Brief for Respondents at 15, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 678 (No. 13-354), 2013 WL 5720377. 
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4); see also Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 624 (6th 
Cir. ����) (noting that “[t]he corporate form offers several advantages,” including “limitation of 
liability” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
9 Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to disputes 
that are concrete enough to present a “case[]” or “controvers[y].” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
10 See, e.g., Autocam, 730 F.3d at 620; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
11 Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1126, 1128-29. 
12 See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1210, 1216-18 
(D.C. Cir. 2013). 
13 For a thorough analysis and thoughtful commentary on the merits issues, see Eugene 
Volokh, Archive: Hobby Lobby, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://www.volokh.com/category/hobby-
lobby/ (last updated Dec. 11, 2013, 5:56 PM). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil 
Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 235, 237 
(2013) (arguing that “the law of veil piercing provides the analytical framework currently missing” 
from the decisions addressing the mandate); Thomas E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul—The 
Business Entity Law Response to Challenges to the PPACA Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 26-56), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
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made more challenging by two background features of the legal landscape. 
First, although the Court has long held that corporations are legal persons 
and possess certain constitutional rights, the Court has never adopted a 
unified theory of corporate constitutional rights and has preferred to 
consider each issue on its own merits.14 Thus, the Court must consider the 
question of free exercise (whether framed as a constitutional or statutory 
analysis) without the benefit of clear principles to guide its analysis, and 
with limited institutional competence in matters of corporate governance. 
Second, any holding the Court might render regarding individual or 
corporate standing would necessarily rest upon features of state corporate 
law. Because corporations are creatures of state law, the scope of the 
corporate charter as well as the governance rules that define the respective 
roles of shareholders, directors, and officers are determined by state, not 
federal law.15 For example, the salience of the fact that the cases before the 
Court involve closely held, family-owned corporations depends upon the 
extent to which a jurisdiction recognizes special rules for close corporations, 
including the flexibility to tailor the corporate contract to suit the investors’ 
objectives.16  
We offer a much simpler alternative: under well-established exceptions 
to the prudential rule against third-party standing, one party can sometimes 
assert the interests of a third party.17 Allowing Hobby Lobby and Conestoga 
 
id=2294582; Dahlia Lithwick, Corporations Are People, the Biblical Sequel, SLATE (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/supreme_court_and_obamacare_ 
contraception_mandate_are_companies_persons.html. 
14 See, e.g., Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed 
Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005); Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., 
The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation 
After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1348 (1979); Elizabeth Pollman, 
Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1631-63 (2011). 
15 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 14 (2002). 
16 Generalizations in this area are especially difficult because some jurisdictions take an 
expansive view of the fiduciary obligations owed among shareholders while others emphasize the 
importance of specific, contractual bargaining to protect minority interests. Compare Wilkes v. 
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (Mass. 1976) (holding that the majority 
shareholders of a close corporation owe a fiduciary “duty of utmost good faith and loyalty”), with 
Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993) (“The tools of good corporate practice are 
designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection 
before parting with consideration.”). 
17 As a general matter, litigants may advance only their own claims. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, ��� (����) (“[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the ‘case or 
controversy’ requirement, this Court has held that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal 
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third 
parties.” (citing Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943))). But the Court has articulated exceptions 
to this rule that fit the circumstances of the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga cases. See, e.g., Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (holding that a reproductive rights advocate had standing to 
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Wood Specialties to litigate religious objections to the mandate on behalf of 
their shareholders obviates the need for the Court to venture into uncharted 
territory.18 The crucial insight is that the corporation’s injury need not be 
religious in nature for the religious objections to the ACA regulations to be 
adjudicated. So long as the corporate plaintiff is injured economically by the 
regulations, it has standing under Article III to challenge them. At that point, 
the corporation’s assertion of the constitutional or statutory rights of absent 
third parties is properly analyzed under the rubric of third-party standing.19 
Below, we first defend our claim that Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood 
Specialties present near-perfect examples of a situation in which prudential 
third-party standing would be appropriate.20 As family-owned businesses, 
the corporations are “extension[s] of family relationships,”21 and there is 
every reason to expect that the corporations will serve as effective advocates 
for their owners. Moreover, unless the corporations can object on behalf of 
their shareholders, the shareholders may be “denied a forum in which to 
assert their own rights.”22 
 
“assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives”); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 
U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (granting third-party standing where “it would be difficult if not impossible 
for the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court”). 
18 In analogous circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has used third-party standing doctrine to 
avoid unnecessary questions of first impression. In EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing 
Co., the court observed,  
Townley [the corporation] urges this court to hold that it is entitled to invoke the 
Free Exercise Clause on its own behalf. Because Townley is merely the instrument 
through and by which Mr. and Mrs. Townley express their religious beliefs, it is 
unnecessary to address the abstract issue whether a for profit corporation has rights 
under the Free Exercise Clause independent of those of its shareholders and officers. 
859 F.2d 610, 619-20 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court’s institutional role is broader, and the circuit split 
concerns the very issues the Ninth Circuit declined to decide, but we argue that the Ninth Circuit’s 
cautious approach provides better guidance for the Court than any of the decisions below. 
19 For a related approach, see Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby 
Lobby and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (2013), which argues that the 
corporation should have associational standing to assert unified shareholder interests because the 
corporation’s interests are not distinct from those of its shareholders. Our argument, however, 
does not require a finding that shareholder interests flow through the corporation. Thus, our 
proposal does not call for a special approach to third-party standing in the corporate context. 
20 Although beyond the scope of our present argument, we note that one commentator offers 
third-party standing as the best approach to a wide range of constitutional questions involving 
corporations. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations 40-60 (Va. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2013-33, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/id=2330972. 
21 Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185, 
1194 (2013). 
22 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446. Of course, asserting a right is not the same as establishing 
it. The point, rather, is that impediments to standing are not dispositive of, or necessarily even 
relevant to, the underlying merits.  
13 Hall and Means Final Link Fixed.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  5/16/2014 1:50 PM 
2014]    Third-Party Standing of Family-Owned Corporations 155 
Second, if the badly fractured decisions below do not already serve as a 
cautionary tale, we elaborate the difficulties the Court would encounter 
were it to accept the parties’ invitation to wade into the morass of defining 
corporate constitutional rights. The inquiry is daunting because it involves 
application of an imperfectly defined right of free exercise to an imperfectly 
defined subject. Corporations are legal persons defined by state statutes, 
and while they enjoy certain constitutional rights,23  the Court has not 
previously adopted an overarching theory that explains when corporations 
can assert rights and when they cannot.24 The Court is at a disadvantage in 
addressing these questions as it lacks any particular expertise in matters of 
state corporate law. Put bluntly, we offer the Court a way to resolve the 
cases before it that, unlike the approaches advocated by the parties, avoids 
the need to decide questions of first impression regarding the free exercise 
rights of for-profit corporations. 
I. THE CASE FOR THIRD-PARTY STANDING 
Ordinarily, litigants may not assert the rights of third parties.25 However, 
the Court has crafted an exception for cases like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, 
in which the litigant seeks to assert the rights of related nonparties who face 
obstacles that prevent them from asserting those rights directly. 26  As 
summarized in a leading treatise, “third-party standing requires three 
elements: an injury in fact to a party, a close relationship to the nonparty 
whose rights are asserted, and some significant obstacle that impedes the 
nonparty’s assertion of his own rights.”27 We address each element in turn. 
A. Injury in Fact 
Corporations that defy the ACA mandate are subject to penalties that 
satisfy the constitutional requirement of concrete injury. The ACA requires 
corporations to provide insurance coverage that includes “preventive care 
 
23 See Willis, supra note 19, at 35-36; see also Garrett, supra note 20, at 15-40. 
24 Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptual-
ized as a grantee of a state concession, a nexus of . . . contracts, . . . or any other recognized 
model.” (citations omitted)); Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free 
Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 501-06 (2011) 
(highlighting the importance of fundamental corporate theory for constitutional analysis of 
corporate rights).  
25 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
26 See supra note 17. 
27 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.9.3, at 737 (3d ed. 2008). 
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and screenings” for women as specified in guidelines set by the Health 
Resources and Services Administration.28 Those guidelines require coverage 
of “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, 
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women 
with reproductive capacity.”29  Failure to abide by the mandate triggers 
“immediate tax penalties, potential regulatory action, and possible private 
lawsuits.”30 For Hobby Lobby, the tax penalties alone could total almost 
$475 million per year.31 There is nothing abstract about a fine.32  
B. Close Relationship 
In assessing third-party standing, the Court has required both a relation-
ship between the litigant and the third party and a connection between that 
relationship and the alleged constitutional injury. In the foundational 1925 
case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, for instance, two private schools successfully 
challenged an Oregon state law requiring all children to attend public 
schools.33 The plaintiff schools (each, incidentally, a corporation, and one a 
for-profit corporation)34 alleged an economic injury on their own behalf,35 
and also a violation of substantive due process on behalf of parents wishing 
to send their children to private school.36 The Court permitted the litigant 
corporations to assert the constitutional rights of the absent parents, finding 
that the close relationship between them was tightly connected to the 
alleged violation of the parents’ rights, and therefore justified permitting 
the schools to assert those rights on the parents’ behalf.37 
An even closer relationship exists in the cases involving closely held, 
family-owned businesses now before the Court, which should more than 
 
28 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
29  Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN., 
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
30 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir.) (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 
4980D, 4980H (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012)), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
31 See id. (noting that this figure assumes that the term “individual” in § 4980D(b)(1) refers 
to each of the more than 13,000 individuals insured under Hobby Lobby’s plan).  
32 See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-57 (1953) (holding that threat of “pocketbook 
injury” to litigant was sufficient to create a case or controversy, and permitting litigant to assert 
rights of absent third parties). 
33 268 U.S. 510, 529-33, 535-36 (1925). 
34 Id. at 531-33. 
35 Id. at 531. 
36 Id. at 536. 
37 Id. at 534-36 (noting that the “unlawful interference” with the parents’ right to direct their 
children’s education would lead to “the consequent destruction of [the litigant corporations’] 
business and property”). 
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suffice to establish a prudential basis for third-party standing. First, in all 
corporations, the relationship between shareholders and corporation is not 
one of arm’s-length commercial dealing, as between vendor and vendee. 
Rather, when shareholders invest capital, they become equity owners and 
the corporation has a fiduciary obligation to protect their interests.38 (By 
contrast, the rights of other stakeholders are defined mostly by contract.39) 
Thus, even when control and ownership are separated, as in a typical public 
corporation in which a centralized board of directors makes decisions on 
behalf of passive investors, the interests of shareholders are central to the 
corporate enterprise.40 
Second, in close corporations like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood 
Specialties, the shareholders define the scope and objectives of the business 
venture. As a practical matter, there is no separation of ownership and 
control.41 Thus, it is undisputed and unsurprising that the family owners of 
Hobby Lobby have been able to run the business “according to a set of 
Christian principles.”42 In this regard, moreover, it is worth noting that family 
businesses often reflect family value systems and are governed accordingly.43  
C. Significant Obstacles 
Finally, the Court has limited prudential third-party standing to cases in 
which the nonparties face a substantial obstacle to litigating their interests 
 
38 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 90-91 (1991). The extent to which a corporation’s board must prioritize 
shareholder interests in any particular case is debatable, but only to the extent board independence 
from shareholders maximizes the long-term value of the enterprise for all participants, including 
shareholders. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 287-319 (1999) (arguing that directors serve the interests of the corporation—
“all the individuals who make firm-specific investments and agree to participate in the extracon-
tractual, internal mediation process within the firm”—not just the shareholders). 
39 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 38, at 90-91. 
40 Even corporate law scholars who embrace the board’s independent power and take a dim 
view of shareholder participation in management acknowledge that boards must produce value for 
shareholders. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (“[D]irector accountability for maximizing 
shareholder wealth remains an important component of director primacy.”). 
41 However, even if a corporation has only a single shareholder, the corporate entity retains a 
distinct, legal existence. The rights and grievances of shareholders cannot be attributed to the 
corporation itself. See Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 472, 477, 480 (2006) 
(holding that alleged racial animus toward a corporation’s sole shareholder did not invest the 
corporation with the right to bring a § 1981 claim).  
42 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. 
Ct. 678 (2013). 
43 See Means, supra note 21 (“Whether organized as partnerships, corporations, or LLCs, family 
firms are economic institutions embedded in a context of family social roles and values.”). 
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directly. As the Court has repeatedly recognized, a lack of Article III 
standing may constitute just such an obstacle. In Barrows v. Jackson, for 
instance, the Court allowed a white seller of property to defend a damages 
action alleging breach of a racially restrictive covenant by invoking the 
equal protection rights of nonwhite purchasers.44 The Court stated that, 
because no claim was asserted against the African American buyers of the 
property, “it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose 
rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court,” 45  and 
concluded that “[t]he relation between the coercion exerted on respondent 
[seller] and her possible pecuniary loss thereby is so close to the purpose of 
the restrictive covenant, to violate the constitutional rights of those discrim-
inated against, that respondent is the only effective adversary of the unworthy 
covenant in its last stand.”46 
The Court again addressed the importance of obstacles to a nonparty’s 
standing in Eisenstadt v. Baird, a case involving the distribution of contra-
ceptives to an unmarried college student.47 The defendant, William Baird, 
was charged with violating a criminal statute that prohibited distribution of 
contraceptives to unmarried individuals. 48  The Court allowed Baird to 
assert the equal protection rights of unmarried persons wishing to obtain 
contraceptives, relying on the fact that the absent third parties, “unmarried 
persons denied access to contraceptives in Massachusetts, . . . are not 
themselves subject to prosecution and, to that extent, are denied a forum in 
which to assert their own rights.”49 
Similar obstacles to individual standing exist in the contraception man-
date cases, in that the challenged regulations require the corporate defend-
ants to provide coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptives but impose 
no obligations or liabilities of any kind on the individual plaintiffs.50 Indeed, 
the individual plaintiffs’ choice to organize their businesses as corporations 
protects them from personal liability for the acts or omissions of the 
 
44 346 U.S. 249, 251-52, 255-57 (1953). Barrows arose after Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948), in which the Court held that racially restrictive covenants were not enforceable against 
nonwhite purchasers. Barrows raised the question whether, notwithstanding Shelley, an action for 
damages could be brought by a co-covenantor against a breaching co-covenantor. 346 U.S. at 251. 
45 Barrows, 346 U.S. at 257. 
46 Id. at 259 (emphasis added). 
47 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972).  
48 Id. at 440-41.  
49 Id. at 446. 
50 See Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that the deci-
sion to comply with, and the consequences associated with the mandate fall solely upon the 
corporation, not upon individual shareholders or officers). 
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corporations.51 Thus, like the African American property buyers in Barrows, 
or the unmarried contraceptive user in Eisenstadt, there are forceful argu-
ments that the individual plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood 
Specialties lack a personal Article III injury.52 The Court has repeatedly held 
that such standing concerns present a sufficient obstacle to permit third-
party standing.53  
In sum, the third-party standing doctrine provides a straightforward 
answer to the threshold question of justiciability in Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga. In both cases, and in others still percolating in the lower courts, a 
corporation that fails to offer the required healthcare coverage faces direct 
economic injury, but the religious owners whose constitutional interests are 
ultimately at stake lack any obvious basis for standing because the mandate 
does not apply to them. Therefore, the corporation may be “the only 
effective adversary” able to raise the religious objections of its controlling 
shareholders. As in Eisenstadt and Barrows, the economic penalty faced by 
the corporate litigants is closely intertwined with the religious interests of 
the third-party shareholders. 54  Moreover, when shareholders have the 
ability to control the corporation, as in a family-owned enterprise, the 
required “close relationship”55 is present and there is every reason to believe 
that the corporation will advocate effectively for the owners’ religious 
interests, if permitted to do so. 
 
51 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 38, at 11 (“‘Limited liability’ means only that 
those who contribute equity capital to a firm risk no more than their initial investments . . . .”). 
52 See Autocam, 730 F.3d at 624; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 386-88 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
53 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446 (noting the case for third-party standing was strengthened 
by the fact that the statutory restriction on the sale of contraception did not apply to the potential 
purchaser/users, such that the users would be “denied a forum in which to assert their own 
rights”); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (granting standing where the suit in 
question presented the “unique situation . . . in which it would be difficult if not impossible for 
the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court”). The D.C. 
Circuit has recognized this dilemma and offered a pragmatic, if question-begging, standing-by-
default argument: individual owners must have standing because the corporations do not, and 
someone must have the ability to challenge the law. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The third-party standing doctrine offers a more 
grounded solution.  
54 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 445 (“[M]ore important than the nature of the relationship 
between the litigant and those whose rights he seeks to assert is the impact of the litigation on the 
third-party interests.”); Barrows, 346 U.S. at 259 (“The relation between the coercion exerted on 
respondent and her possible pecuniary loss thereby is so close to the purpose of the restrictive 
covenant, to violate the constitutional rights of those discriminated against, that respondent is the 
only effective adversary . . . .”). 
55 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
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II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF STATE CORPORATE LAW 
In their response to the government’s petition for certiorari, the Hobby 
Lobby plaintiffs contend that because the family owners are “unanimous in 
their belief that the contraceptive-coverage requirement violates the 
religious values they attempt to follow” in their business, the “case is an 
ideal vehicle for addressing whether a for-profit business and its owners can 
exercise religion.”56 In fact, the shareholders’ united position only clarifies 
that prudential third-party standing is the appropriate mode of analysis, 
because there is no daylight between the corporation’s position and the 
third parties whose interests would be protected.57 Only if the shareholders 
were in disagreement about the religious values at stake would there be any 
reason for the Court to question the corporation’s ability to represent the 
shareholders’ interests and, perhaps, to reach the difficult questions regard-
ing separate corporate or individual standing. 
Applying third-party standing analysis in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga 
Wood Specialties does leave important questions unanswered, but it is far 
from clear that the Court will ever need to resolve them. There are no 
circumstances in which controlling shareholders can prioritize their private 
values, whether religious or otherwise, over the fundamental goal of produc-
ing value for all stockholders.58 For example, in a recent case involving a 
conflict between a minority investor that wanted the corporation to mone-
tize its market position and controlling shareholders who sought to provide 
a community service and keep for-profit activities to a minimum, the 
Delaware Chancery Court held that “[t]he corporate form . . . is not an 
appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there 
 
56 Brief for Respondents, supra note 7, at 20-21 (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). The government agrees that the issue of standing is properly before the Court. See Brief for 
the Petitioners at 26-31, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (No. 13-354), 
2014 WL 173486. 
57 See EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 619-20 (9th Cir. 1988) (declining 
to “address the abstract issue whether a for profit corporation has rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause independent of those of its shareholders and officers” because the closely held corporation 
was “merely the instrument” through which its owners expressed their uniformly held religious 
beliefs). In contrast, it is unlikely that a shareholder’s religious beliefs would be given any weight 
in a public corporation. Given the diverse corporate congregation, the duty to maximize profits 
may be the only overarching tenet of the faith.  
58 See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T]he duty of loyalty 
therefore mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the 
benefit of the providers of equity capital, as warranted for an entity with perpetual life in which 
the residual claimants have locked in their investment.”); In re Novell, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. 
No. 6032-VCN, 2013 WL 322560, at *7 (Del Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) (“There is no single path that a 
board must follow in order to maximize stockholder value, but directors must follow a path of 
reasonableness which leads toward that end.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their invest-
ment.”59 As the court further observed, “[i]f [the controlling shareholders] 
were the only stockholders affected by their decisions, then there would be 
no one to object.”60 Thus, absent shareholder unanimity, the Court might 
never need to decide the difficult questions of first impression regarding the 
free exercise rights of for-profit corporations.  
To be clear, we assume that state corporate law will continue to require 
unanimous approval for any fundamental departure from the basic profit-
seeking function of the corporate form. 61  Under no circumstances can 
shareholders waive a corporation’s responsibility to comply with existing 
law; rather, the issue is whether the corporation can engage in costly 
defiance in order to vindicate a purely religious interest without violating its 
fiduciary obligation to its shareholders. Most corporate decisions involving 
religion will fall within the protection of the business judgment rule, so long 
as the controlling shareholders can articulate a long-term business interest 
served—for instance, building a brand identity, earning customer loyalty, 
and the like.62  However, to the extent corporate law goes further and 
permits a corporation to assert a supervening religious interest, even absent 
shareholder unanimity, the scope of the corporation’s newfound authority 
would be a matter of state law. 
Thus, if the Court were to hold that for-profit corporations or their 
individual shareholders can object to the ACA mandate based on either 
statutory or constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, federal and 
state law principles would intertwine, ceding ultimate control over who may 
 
59 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
60 Id. We do not attempt here an exhaustive survey of state law rules regarding the obliga-
tion to maximize profits for shareholders, and we recognize the possibility that fiduciary con-
straints may vary in other jurisdictions. However, the general proposition that minority 
shareholder interests cannot be subverted to serve noncorporate purposes does not require precise 
elaboration. Also, to the extent state laws differ, the lack of uniformity only emphasizes the 
difficulty the Court would face were it to seek to define standing based upon state law rather than 
prudential Article III analysis. 
61 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (2011) (authorizing shareholders in close corpo-
rations to substantially modify the rules of corporate governance subject only to public policy 
limitations, but requiring that any such modifications be approved by all shareholders). 
62 For example, if a store closes on Sundays it may lose significant business, but an increase 
in customer loyalty could lead to even greater long-term profitability. Moreover, absent some 
conflict of interest or serious defect in the decisionmaking process, the managers’ judgment would 
be protected by the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 777, 781 
(Ill. App. Ct. ����) (affirming, under the business judgment rule, dismissal of derivative 
shareholder lawsuit to compel “the installation of lights in Wrigley Field and the scheduling of 
night baseball games”). 
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litigate corporate free exercise claims to state lawmakers.63 Such entangle-
ment is unavoidable because, even if couched as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, a holding that for-profit corporations have free exercise rights 
would immediately raise questions about how to determine the precise 
content of a corporation’s religious beliefs. And, again, because corporations 
are creatures of state law, these questions could be answered only by 
reference to state corporate law.  
Hobby Lobby is closely held and its shareholders apparently hold uni-
form religious beliefs.64 But easy cases make bad law.65 Given a more typical 
corporation with shareholders of diverse religious beliefs, the method for 
determining which of those beliefs the corporation can adopt as its own 
would control the issue of free exercise. And, critically, states could adopt a 
wide range of approaches. Some states would surely continue to require 
shareholder unanimity, thereby restricting any right of free exercise to 
closely held businesses; others might empower even public corporations to 
declare religious beliefs through a charter amendment subject to a majority 
shareholder vote. States might also establish a separate business entity form 
to facilitate investment in a for-profit business defined by its religious 
identity.66 In essence, the difficulty with recognizing corporate free exercise 
rights, as the Tenth Circuit did in Hobby Lobby, is that state control over 
corporate governance gives state lawmakers the power to determine whether 
and how those rights may be enforced.  
Notably, the Court’s previous foray into the First Amendment interests 
of corporations provides little comfort. Although it has received its fair 
share of critical commentary, Citizens United v. FEC,67 a recent case involv-
ing campaign finance limitations imposed upon corporations, has not been 
 
63 The overlap of federal and state law is not, of course, unique to this area of corporate law. 
For instance, federal securities law regulating the inclusion of shareholder proposals in corporate 
proxy materials defers to state law regarding what matters are appropriate for shareholder action. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2013). In the context of free exercise, however, a lack of uniformity 
would affect a fundamental constitutional right. 
64 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 7, at 20-21. 
65 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 315 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“The familiar aphorism that hard cases make bad law should extend 
to easy cases as well.”). 
66 In recent years, a number of states have enacted new legislation to authorize the formation 
of so-called “benefit corporations,” in which managers are authorized to pursue stated goals other 
than profit maximization. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in 
Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1008-10 (2013). It would be a relatively small step to include 
religion in a list of authorized, alternative purposes or to create a new “R-Corp” entity choice. 
67 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
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vulnerable to circumvention at the state level68 because the Court’s holding 
concerning the First Amendment right of free expression did not turn on 
state-specific issues of corporate law. The Court’s holding in Citizens United 
relied, in part, on the potential value of corporate speech for listeners in a 
marketplace of ideas.69 From that perspective, corporate speech could have 
value and thus merit protection regardless of whether corporations speak to 
participate in a collective deliberation about truth, or to express moral 
values, or more plausibly, whenever the cost of speaking is exceeded by the 
expected profits to be gained.70 Moreover, the corporation’s profit-seeking 
purposes could be advanced apart from any distinctive ethical values held 
by individual shareholders.  
To be sure, our concerns about the interplay of federal and state law 
involve a fair bit of speculation. We do not know how the Court might rule 
in the first instance, and we do not purport to envision all possible responses 
that inventive state legislatures might devise. For our purposes, it suffices to 
observe that a wide range of outcomes is possible—and perhaps even 
likely—at the state level, given the intense controversy surrounding the 
religious issues at stake and the difficulty of addressing corporate standing 
without relying upon state law definitions of the corporation.  
Therefore, to avoid these concerns and to better conserve the Court’s 
reputational capital, we respectfully submit that prudential third-party 
standing provides the most successful solution to the general issue of 
justiciability. Our recommended approach is grounded principally in federal 
law and is based on prudential principles that rest upon constitutional law 
considerations within the Court’s core area of expertise.  
CONCLUSION 
Unless the Court holds that the claims pursued by Hobby Lobby, 
Conestoga Wood Specialties, and other similarly situated businesses are 
 
68 To date, the Court has faced only one effort by a state court to circumvent Citizens United. 
In American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, the Court reversed a Montana Supreme Court 
decision that held that the rationale of Citizens United did not apply in Montana. 132 S. Ct. 2490, 
2491 (2012). The Bullock case underscores the desirability of basing any decision in Hobby Lobby 
and other pending cases on federal justiciability law, and not state corporate law. Cf. Matthew I. 
Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1264-65 (2011) (discussing the Founders’ 
concern with the “truly deplorable” mischiefs that would ensue from nonuniform application of 
federal laws in different states). 
69 See 130 S. Ct. at 896; Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 1052-53 (2011). 
70 Cf. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 985-87 
(2009) (arguing against the marketplace metaphor for speech protection and, concomitantly, 
against corporate speech rights). 
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nonjusticiable, thereby affirming the substantive provisions of the mandate 
by default, the Court faces an unpalatable choice: either inflate the fiction of 
corporate personhood to include the most uniquely human of traits—the ability 
to worship—or, no less problematic, flatly disregard the distinct legal person-
hood of corporate litigants so that individual owners can challenge laws that do 
not apply directly to them as infringements of their own religious liberty.  
We have argued that these cases can be resolved more simply, and more 
appropriately, under the existing doctrine of prudential third-party stand-
ing. Rather than attributing injury to individuals not subject to the mandate 
or endowing a legal fiction with religious beliefs, third-party standing doctrine 
permits corporate plaintiffs to challenge the mandate by asserting the constitu-
tional interests of others—that is, the religious beliefs of their shareholders.71 
Reliance upon third-party standing doctrine to resolve Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Wood Specialties would be consistent with the Court’s usual 
practice of proceeding cautiously and incrementally. Although other 
litigants have invited it to do so, the Court has studiously avoided defining 
the full scope of corporate constitutional rights72—often by relying on the 
concept of third-party standing.73 Even if there may come a time when the 
Court must decide whether a for-profit corporation can assert religious 
objections to governmental regulation, it is not necessary to decide that 
difficult question on the facts presented here. As Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote during his tenure on the D.C. Circuit, “if it is not necessary to decide 
more, it is necessary not to decide more.”74 
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71 Alternatively, one could take the position that the business owners’ choice to incorporate 
for profit precludes their religious objection to the ACA mandate. However, not only would this 
approach rest upon malleable state law conceptions of the shareholder’s role, but it would also 
require the Court to decide, as a matter of first impression, whether a for-profit corporation has an 
independent free exercise right. 
72 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (refusing to “address 
the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy 
under the First Amendment” and resolving the case on narrower grounds); see also Garrett, supra 
note 20, at 9-15.  
73 Cf. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, at 712 (“The very difficulty of determining whether a 
litigant has a personal right, whether derived from the rights of others or standing independently, 
may justify direct reliance on the rights of others.”). 
74 PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
